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Comments
THE MISSOURI MUNICIPALITY'S POWER TO ZONE PUBLIC AND
QUASI-PUBLIC USES
Section 89.020, Revised Statutes of Missouri (1949), is the enabling act by
which the General Assembly has delegated to Missouri municipalities the power
to zone uses of property. It provides, in part:
For the purpose of promoting health, safety, morals, or the general
welfare of the community, the legislative body of all incorporated towns
and villages is hereby empowered to regulate and restrict . . . the
location and use of buildings, structures and land for trade, industry,
residence, or other purposes. (Emphasis added.)
Recently, there have been two Missouri cases interpreting this enabling
act in such a manner as to exclude particular uses from the municipality's zoning
power. They were concerned with the erection of a public school and a synagogue.
In State ex rel. St. Louis Union Trust Co. v. Ferriss,1 the City of Ladue had
enacted a comprehensive zoning plan under the enabling act set out above.
As part of this plan, the ordinances contained certain provisions restricting
the location and erection of school buildings to certain areas within the city.
Nevertheless, the school district filed a condemnation suit in the St. Louis
County circuit court to locate a school in an area from which the zoning regula-
tions excluded school facilities. An original prohibition proceeding was filed in
the Missouri Supreme Court to prohibit the judge of the circuit court from
hearing the condemnation suit. The plaintiff claimed that the ordinance passed
in pursuance of the enabling act deprived the school district of its condemnation
power in the areas of the city which were not zoned for schools. The school
district showed, however, that it was charged by statute with the exclusive
duty of locating school facilities2 and on this basis claimed that the zoning
regulation was ineffective in its attempted application. Held, provisional rule
in prohibition discharged. Chapter 89, Revised Statutes of Missouri (1949), did
not give the municipality the power to immunize private property from the
express power vested in the school district by the General Assembly to select,
locate, take by eminent domain and use property for a public school upon
payment of just compensation. The court found that Chapter 165, Revised
Statutes of Missouri (1949), relied upon by the school district, implemented a
1. 304 S.W.2d 896 (Mo. 1957) (en banc).
2. §§ 165.100, .370, RSMo 1949.
1
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constitutional mandates that the General Assembly shall establish and main-
tain a state-wide system of schools. It was then noted that the enabling act
gave no express power to cities appertaining to the regulation or restriction of
schools and other public buildings. The rule of ejusdem generis was applied
to negative any construction of the enabling act that could apply in the public
school situation.4 That is, the specific terms "trade," "industry" and "residence"
all relate to private property; the general words following them, "or other
purposes," were then interpreted to be within the same general meaning and
application as those specifically mentioned, as appertaining to private property
only and not embracing schools and other public buildings. 5 The court would
not invest the municipality with the power to restrict the exercise of the school
district's delegated power of eminent domain. The court noted, however, that
the school district would be subject to police regulations in the use of its facilities,
such as, for example, safety regulations.6 It also noted that the location of
public institutions could most likely be controlled if their nature was proprietary
rather than governmental.7
In the second case, Congregation Temple Israel v. City of Creve Coeur,8
the municipality had enacted ordinances under which the plaintiff was denied a
permit to build a synagogue on its property. After the plaintiff had contracted
to purchase the land in question, the ordinances were amended to provide that
no church, school, park, hospital, etc., could be built in the city unless a special
permit was issued by the Board of Aldermen. There were no standards set
out for granting such a permit. The plaintiff was denied a permit and then
brought this suit for a declaratory judgment that the ordinances were invalid
and for an injunction against the defendants' enforcing the ordinances. Held,
judgment for the plaintiff affirmed. The court followed the Ferriss case in its
interpretation of the enabling act, joining schools and churches in the same
classification, apart from trade, industry, residence or other similar purposes.
The concept of religious freedom under the first amendment of the United States
Constitution (as applied to the several states by the fourteenth amendment)9
3. 304 S.W.2d at 902-903. The constitutional mandate referred to is MO.
CONST. art IX, § 1(a), which provides: "A general diffusion of knowledge and
intelligence being essential to the preservation of the rights and liberties of the
people, the general assembly shall establish and maintain free public schools. . .
4. 304 S.W.2d at 900; accord, Hall v. City of Taft, 47 Cal. 2d 177, 302
P.2d 574 (1956).
5. 304 S.W.2d at 900; 28 C.J.S. Ejusdem (1941).
6. 304 S.W.2d at 899; accord, Smith v. Board of Educ., 359 Mo. 264, 221
S.W.2d 203 (1949) (en banc) (concerning sanitation regulations); Kansas City v.
School Dist., 356 Mo. 364, 201 S.W.2d 930 (1947) (concerning smokestack, boiler,etc.). 7. 304 S.W.2d at 902; accord, Baltis v. Village of Westchester, 3 Il. 2d 388,
121 N.E.2d 495 (1954) (water system); Taber v. City of Benton Harbor, 280
Mich. 522, 274 N.W. 324 (1937) (water system); O'Brien v. Town of Greenburgh,
239 App. Div. 555, 268 N.Y. Supp. 173 (1933) (garbage and refuse disposal).
8. 320 S.W.2d 451 (Mo. 1959).
9. Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296 (1940); Murdock v. Pennsylvania,
319 U.S. 105 (1943).
[Vol. 26
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was also brought to bear on the problem to show that the intent of the legisla-
ture did not include placing power in the state's municipalities to restrict
the location and use of buildings and land for churches1 0 The court noted that
churches would be subject to police regulations just as schools were said to be
in the Ferriss case. A motion for rehearing or to transfer to the court en banc
was overruled.17 The court reiterated the basis for the decision in the Ferriss
case and pointed to the added ground of religious freedom in this case. The
court then allayed any fears of over-expansion of zoning immunity by saying:
This ruling does not mean, as defendants suggest, that it permits
in all residential districts, cemeteries, hospitals, museums, lodge halls, club
houses, libraries, private schools and many other types of institutional
structures. Since a charge or other consideration is required for the services
or facilities of such institutions, we do not think it would be un-
reasonable to say that they are similar purposes to 'trade, industry,
residence' and that this clause of the statute may be reasonably con-
strued to include them. ... 12
In Missouri, as the principal cases illustrate, the legislature has invested
the cities with the state's police power to zone when it is necessary in the
interests of public health, safety, morals, and general welfare. It should be noted
that a municipal corporation has no inherent authority to zone in absence of
an express delegation from the state by constitutional provision, statute or
charter.1 ' However, zoning in some cases can be supported under the power of
eminent domain with compensation being paid owners damaged by result of such
restrictions.1 4
As indicated in the principal cases, the municipalities' power to zone is by
no means plenary, for the enabling act is construed as excluding schools and
other public buildings from zoning restrictions under the rule of ejusdem generis15
Also, zoning enactments must conform with both the state and federal con-
stitutions 6 and must not exceed the allowable limits of the police power 17
Therefore, the Missouri approach in these two cases is not the only lane open
to one seeking to have a particular zoning ordinance declared invalid. In some
cases the courts are able to deal with the church or school situations by finding
that the zoning ordinance is an arbitrary, discriminatory and improper use of
the police power in a manner not relating to the health, safety, morals or
10. 320 S.W.2d at 454. See generally, Comment, Zoning the Church, 3 ST.
Louis U.L.J. 265 (1955).
11. 320 S.W.2d at 456.
12. 320 S.W.2d at 457.
13. Rose v. City of Andalusia, 249 Ala. 333, 31 So.2d 66 (1947); Trust Co. of
Chicago v. City of Chicago, 408 Ill. 91, 96 N.E.2d 499 (1951); Piper v. Moore, 163
Kan. 565, 183 P.2d 965 (1947); Wertheimer v. Schwab, 124 Misc. 822, 210 N.Y.
Supp. 312 (Sup. Ct 1925); 8 MCQUILLEN, MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS §§ 25.32, .35
(3rd ed. 1957).
14. Kansas City v. Liebi, 298 Mo. 569, 252 S.W. 404 (1923) (en banc).
15. See cases cited note 6 supra.
16. City of Birmingham v. Monk, 185 F.2d 859 (5th Cir. 1950).
17. City of Sherman v. Simms, 143 Tex. 115, 182 S.W.2d 415 (1944).
1961]
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general welfare of the community and thereby violates the due process require-
ment.'8 Among the cases holding certain ordinances invalid when excluding
these uses, on the ground that such exclusion was arbitrary and unreasonable,
may be found some decisions which are seemingly based on the denial of equal
protection rather than the denial of due process.19 This would seem proper if
the excluded uses were closely parallel to those permitted but it would also seem
that the similarity of undesirable effects should not preclude the city from
distinguishing the uses in terms of social value.
In the church cases the churches may rely on the protection of the first
amendment to the United States Constitution, as applied to the states by the
fourteenth amendment; and article I, section 5 of the Missouri Constitution,
concerning the free exercise of religion, is an available argument for exclusion
from the zoning authority.20 Yet courts and litigants generally seem to avoid
these provisions. In the Congregation Temple Israel case the court approached
the free exercise of religion aspect only for support of the idea that the enabling
acts enumeration of powers was not intended to extend to churches.2 However,
this opinion has exhaustive citations to cases holding invalid ordinances which
18. In Diocese of Rochester v. Planning Bd., 1 N.Y.2d 508, 136 N.E.2d 827,
154 N.Y.S.2d 849 (1956), the court held that a zoning board of appeal's denial of a
permit to build a church and school was improper when based on the facts that
there were no schools or churches in the area, that a loss of potential tax revenue
would result and that the enjoyment of neighboring property would be decreased.
The denial bore no substantial relation to the purpose of the zoning ordinance to
promote the public health, safety, morals and general welfare, and such a decision
was arbitrary and unreasonable. Accord, City of Sherman v. Simms, 143 Tex. 115,
183 S.W.2d 415 (1944). Contra, City of Chico v. First Ave. Baptist Church, 108
Cal. App. 2d 297, 238 P.2d 587 (Dist. Ct. App. 1951); Church of Jesus Christ v.
City of Porterville, 90 Cal. App. 2d 656, 203 P.2d 823 (Dist. Ct. App.), appeal
dismissed, 338 U.S. 805 (1949) (exclusion held a valid exercise of police power);
Miami Beach United Luthern Church of the Epiphany v. City of Miami Beach,
82 So.2d 880 (Fla. 1955). See also Matthews v. First Christian Church, 355 Mo.
627, 197 S.W.2d 617 (1946); Rombauer v. Compton Heights Christian Church,
328 Mo. 1, 40 S.W.2d 545 (1931); Proetz v. Central Dist. of Christian & Missionary
Alliance, 191 S.W.2d 273 (St. L. Ct. App. 1945). These Missouri cases hold restric-
tive covenants valid and that to allow a church in the restricted areas would in
essence be a violation of due process as to the owner's property rights under the
restrictive covenants. Contra, State ex rel. Bishop of Reno v. Hill, 59 Nev. 231, 90
P.2d 217 (1939) (a restrictive covenant was held to deprive the church of its
property without due process). In Peters v. Buckner, 288 Mo. 618, 232 S.W. 1024
(1921) (en banc), the court required the school district to pay just compensation
for rights secured under deeds containing covenants restricting an area to solely
residential uses and giving each owner in a subdivision an easement in every other
parcel. These, the court held, constituted substantial property rights for which the
condemning authority must pay compensation. It was noted that the power of the
school district to condemn under the state's authority was not bound by such agree-
ments in any way other than the requirement of just compensation being paid for
the property rights secured under them.
19. E.g., Valley View Village v. Proffett, 221 F.2d 412 (6th Cir. 1955).
20. Board of Zoning Appeals v. Decatur, Ind., Co. of Jehovah's Witnesses,
233 Ind. 83, 117 N.E.2d 115 (1954).
21. 320 S.W.2d at 454.
[Vol. 26
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have excluded churches or religious schools from residential areas where no
question of authority under an enabling act was raised.
22
These two Missouri cases carry implications far beyond their holdings on
their particular facts. They plainly suggest that there are uses other than the
public school and church uses previously mentioned which are immune from a
municipality's zoning regulations-an undefined twilight zone of quasi-public uses.
On motion for rehearing the court in the Congregatiowr Temple Israel case shows
some degree of concern for this problem;23 however, the court did not indicate
a definite formula for illuminating this twilight zone. Nor are the courts consistent
from jurisdiction to jurisdiction 4
In at least two parts of the public and quasi-public use area noted above
there is no confusion. When federal projects come into conflict with local zoning
restrictions, the federal statutes authorizing construction are part of the supreme
law of the land and therefore cannot be challenged as an invasion of the state
and municipal field of zoning regulation.2 5 Also, zoning restrictions cannot apply
to state agencies vested with the power of eminent domain to condemn for
public purposes.2 6
But in other parts of the public and quasi-public use area relative darkness
prevails. In these parts public or quasi-public uses may or may not fall within
the scope of the zoning power although the enabling act may seemingly include
them. Churches and public schools present only the most common of the con-
troversies. Not so common examples would be the construction of airport
facilities27 or the exclusion of non-profit humanitarian uses 28 To exclude private
or parochial schools from an area in which public schools are allowed may be
invalid,29 while to exclude schools of higher learning from areas where public
and parochial schools are admitted may be proper.30 As to hospitals, the city
22. Ibid.
23. 320 S.W.2d at 457 (quoted in text accompanying note 12 supra).
24. For an example concerning admission to residential area of a municipal
garbage disposal plant see O'Brien v. Town of Greenburgh, 239 App. Div. 555, 268
N.Y. Supp. 173 (1933), aff'd, 266 N.Y. 582, 195 N.E. 210 (1935) (city cannot
erect plant). Contra, De Palma v. Town Plan Comm'n, 123 Conn. 257, 193 At.
868 (1937).
25, Tim v. City of Long Branch, 135 N.J.L. 549, 53 A.2d 164 (Ct. Err. & App.
1947).
26. State ex rel. Ohio Turnpike Comm'n v. Allen, 158 Ohio St. 168, 107
N.E.2d 345 (1952).
27. Stengle v. Crandon, 156 Fla. 592, 23 So.2d 835 (1945) (exclusion of an
airport held to be arbitrary, unreasonable and therefore invalid). Such exclusions
are generally invalid as violation of due process unless a proper relation to the
public health, safety, morals or welfare can be shown.
28. Village of University Heights v. Cleveland Jewish Orphans' Home, 20
F.2d "743 (6th Cir. 1927); Women's Kansas City St. Andrew Society v. Kansas City,
58 F.2d 593 (8th Cir. 1932) (philanthropic old people's home).
29. Roman Catholic Welfare Corp. v. City of Piedmont, 45 Cal. 2d 325, 289
P.2d 438 (1955); Diocese of Rochester v. Planning Bd., 1 N.Y.2d 508, 154
N.Y.S.2d 849, 136 N.E.2d 827 (1956); Lumpkin v. Township Comm., 134 N.J.L.
428, 48 A.2d 798 (Sup. Ct. 1946).
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may regulate within reasonable limits their admission to residential areas8 1 and
in some jurisdictions they can be completely excluded.8 2
In the matter of set-back requirements in zoning ordinances, they are
proper if related to the public health, safety and welfare and if statutory re-
quirements are fulfilled.33 It has been held that an otherwise valid set-back
requirement can be properly applied against a church. 34 It therefore seems
proper to consider it as within a municipality's power to apply similar regulations
to other quasi-public buildings.
Area restrictions are another field in which questions arise when quasi-public
uses are involved. The power of a city to enact ordinances that impose area
restrictions will depend upon the particular enabling act. Where it is within
the city's power to so act, its action must still bear a substantial relation to
the health, safety, and general welfare of the public and not be unreasonable
or arbitrary. For example, in State ex rel. Westminster Presbyterian Church v.
Edgecomb,38 the proper relation to the public welfare was not found by the
court and the attempted application of a twenty-five per cent coverage restric-
tion was deemed unreasonable and arbitrary, even though the court apparently
assigned no special category to the plaintiff because it was a religious society.
This will occur in most church cases and in many other quasi-public use situations.
One last example in this area is that of off-street parking requirements
imposed by municipalities. Such ordinances are valid if properly related to the
public health, safety and general welfare, if they are within the scope of the
state's enabling act, and if they are definite and certain in their terms. But they
have been held invalid when applied to churches.8  The Missouri court, however,
shows a disposition toward allowing such requirements to be applied to churches.Yr
Thus this twilight zone of quasi-public uses defies any set formula of
elucidation when the question of municipal zoning is raised. There seems to be,
however, little doubt that any reasonable zoning regulations in the nature of
actual safety precautions, sanitation requirements, electrical and plumbing codes,
etc., can be imposed on most public or quasi-public uses. Also, according to
the Ferriss case, proprietary public uses and, apparently, proprietary quasi-public
uses, fall within the enabling act.
The court's distinction in the Congregation Temple Israel case between uses
making charges and those not so charging adds some light to the enabling
act's authority but still leaves the problem clouded. This distinction in itself
is far from satisfactory and upon examination does not appear to be sound
31. Shepard v. City of Seattle, 59 Wash. 363, 109 Pac. 1067 (1910).
32. Jones v. City of Los Angeles, 211 Cal. 304, 295 Pac. 14 (1930).
33. Wood v. Town of Avondale, 72 Ariz. 217, 232 P.2d 963 (1951).
34. Board of Zoning Appeals v. Decatur, Ind., Co. of Jehovah's Witnesses,
233 Ind. 83, 117 N.E.2d 115 (1954).
35. State ex rel. Westminster Presbyterian Church v. Edgecomb, 108 Neb.
859, 189 N.W. 617 (1922).
36. State ex rel. Tampa, Fla., Co. of Jehovah's Witnesses v. City of Tampa,
48 So.2d 78 (Fla. 1950); Board of Zoning Appeals v. Decatur, Ind., Co. of
Jehovah's Witnesses, supra note 34.
37. 320 S.W.2d at 456.
[Vol. 26
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even as applied in the case before the court. It is true that no membership fee
or specific charge is levied by a church. But the fact is that a church is anything
but a free institution to its membership. Further, this distinction would fail to
maintain the city's protection of private property rights in such cases as a free
pauper's cemetery, a free museum or perhaps something as uncommon as a free
leper's sanatorium when such uses are attempted in a solely residential area.
One need mot go so far as this to provide examples that point to the fact that
the charge distinction must ultimately fail if the purpose of the enabling act is
to be preserved.
At this point one should realize that quasi-public uses are generally immune
from zoning restrictions enacted under Missouri's enabling act and that the
municipal corporation's power over city development and growth is thereby bur-
dened with a serious impediment. But possibly there is another route available
to gain the end desired by the city without utilizing the enabling act. This is
the power to act in the interest of the public health, safety and general welfare
without reliance upon the enabling act. The independent existence of this power
is intimated throughout the cases.
A movement toward recognizing this as an alternative theory upon which
to uphold a zoning regulation is apparent in Flora Reality & Inv. Co. v. City
of Ladue. 88 There the city had enacted a three acre area requirement for single
family residences and had relied on the enabling act in so doing. This approached
economic segregation to maintain high cost residences in the area; yet the court
upheld the city's action on the theory that it was the exercise of the city's
power to act for the health and general welfare. While the enabling act was
relied on in this case, the relation between the three acre requirement and the
enabling act's criteria was not readily apparent. The peculiar location and needs
of the city were considered with the somewhat thin arguments that street con-
gestion, fire safety, health and adequate light and air demanded the rather un-
reasonable requirement.
In considering the control a municipality may exercise without the support
of the enabling act, it must be remembered that in Missouri the power of the
municipal corporation is limited to that expressly granted to it or to those powers
necessarily or fairly implied as incident to such express powers.8 9 Any fair and
reasonable doubt concerning the existence of a city's powers is resolved against
it and the power is denied.40 Possible support for property regulation without
the enabling act may be found in article IV, section 37, of the Missouri Con-
stitution. The health and general welfare of the people are there said to be
matters of primary public concern, and the General Assembly is given authority
to grant power with respect to these subjects to counties, cities, and other political
2ubdivisions of the state. Chapter 192, Revised Statutes of Missouri (1949),
38. 246 S.W.2d 771 (Mo. 1952) (en banc); noted, Eckhardt, Property, 18
Mo. L. Ruv. 366, at 372 (1953).
39. Williams v. Kansas City, 104 F. Supp. 848 (W.D. Mo. 1952), aff'd, 205
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providing for the creation of a Division of Health, is an example of the legislature's
exercise of this authority to delegate power in the interest of public health and
welfare. There is also some case law on this matter. Kalbfell v. City of St. Louis4 l
declares the city's police power in the interest of the general welfare to be a
continuing one that may require the rights of private property to yield to the
public good when such becomes a menace to the health and welfare of the
community. The city can make a declaration controlling such uses when the
public good demands it as long as it is not an arbitrary declaration of nuisance.02
It is not unreasonable for area requirements in their light and air facet to be
upheld under the power to protect the health of the city's inhabitants. The
arguments of the Flora Realty & Inv. Co. case should be capable of supporting
regulations by their own weight. While the court in Flora did not apply its
reasoning to the issue of institutional uses, if a true relation to health or safety
can be made out this may be sufficient to support municipal action restricting
such uses.43 The same would seemingly apply to off-street parking and set-back
requirements.
If a nuisance in fact can be found, quasi-public uses may be controlled by
the injunction device,44 but the cases point out the obvious fact that such uses
are seldom nuisances per se and that a nuisance in fact would of necessity have
to be proved for the remedy to exist. The nuisance remedy is thus seen to be
more effective in the hands of the adjoining land owner than as a tool of the city.
To resolve the confusion that seems to exist in this area, the enabling act
should be amended to allow the municipalities more exclusionary power as long
as it is exercised in a reasonable manner. It is true that schools, churches and
other public and quasi-public uses carry with them an aura of high moral pur-
poses and social value. It is a result of this that the pecuniary losses of a few,
when pleaded alone, are not generally allowed to bar the erection of these in-
stitutions in residentially zoned areas. Yet, when the existence of a restrictive
covenant is added, the property rights secured under it will usually be protected.45
Also, the enforcement of reasonable safety ordinances will be upheld as a valid
exercise of the police power even when asserted against a public or quasi-public
use. Would it not then follow that the right of immunity from particular uses
of adjoining property as set out in reasonable zoning ordinances should be sup-
ported as against churches and certain public and quasi-public uses although
some public uses, such as schools, are -properly admitted under the rationale of
41. 357 Mo. 986, 211 S.W.2d 911 (1948).
42. Ibid.
43. "[Mjunicipalities under the police power have the power of regulation of
the facilities of public schools, and we hold the same thing is true of churches, such
as safety of boilers, smokestacks and similar facilities . . . sanitation . . . , manner
and type of construction for fire protection . . . and certainly likewise off-street
parking facilities, sewage disposal and other matters related to the public health,
safety and welfare." Congregation Temple Israel v. City of Creve Coeur, 320
S.W.2d 451, 456 (Mo. 1959).
44. Murphy v. Cupp, 182 Ark. 334, 31 S.W.2d 396 (1930); Waggoner v.
Floral Heights Baptist Church, 116 Tex. 187, 288 S.W, 129 (1926).
45. Peters v. Buckner, supra note 18.
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